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Abstract 
The paper provides a comparative analysis of the incidence of evaluation methods in 
antipoverty transfer programmes in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The paper 
identifies two broad explanations for the incidence of evaluation in antipoverty transfer 
programmes in developing countries, one emphasizing the advantages of a shift towards 
evidence-based development policy, and a second explanation emphasizing political factors. 
The paper assesses their relevance in the context of Latin American and sub-Saharan African 
countries with a view to throwing light on whether the evaluation of antipoverty transfer 
programmes will lead to an improved effectiveness of the relevant government agencies. 
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 1   
1 Introduction 
The growth of antipoverty transfer programmes in developing countries has been a distinctive 
feature of development policy and practice in the last decade. Programmes providing direct 
transfers in cash and in-kind to households in poverty have sprung up in all developing 
regions, first in middle-income countries but more recently spreading to low-income 
countries. Combined with policies enhancing growth and supporting the provision of basic 
services, antipoverty transfer programmes have the capacity to make a significant 
contribution to the global reduction of poverty and vulnerability. Knowledge of the impact of 
antipoverty transfer programmes is largely based on the findings from experimental and 
quasi-experimental evaluations, which cover a good proportion of antipoverty transfer 
programmes. The use of impact evaluation, uneven such as it is, singles out cash transfer 
programmes among development interventions.1 Two broad explanations are put forward to 
account for the relatively more intensive use of impact evaluation in antipoverty transfer 
programmes. One explanation emphasizes technical factors, as part of a shift towards 
evidence-based development policy (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). A second explanation 
emphasizes political factors, the need to persuade reluctant policy makers and electorates of 
the benefits of effective antipoverty transfers (Levy 2006). The main aim of this paper is to 
assess these explanations with a view to shedding light on whether the evaluation of 
antipoverty transfer programmes will lead to an improved effectiveness of the relevant 
government agencies and/or strengthen their political sustainability.  
 
There is a strong technical case for supporting rigorous monitoring and evaluation of 
antipoverty interventions, and indeed all public policy. Most countries have set in place 
rigorous licensing of food and pharmaceutical products precisely in order to protect the 
population from potential damaging effects. Antipoverty transfer programmes can have 
commensurate effects on the treated population, at the very least. Government agencies 
responsible for antipoverty efforts have a duty to ensure that programmes are effective, are 
based on existing knowledge, and have established processes to learn lessons from their 
implementation. Monitoring and evaluation processes are essential to test innovative 
programmes or programme features. In countries with low capacity, monitoring and 
evaluation processes are an important tool to develop implementation capacity and to enable 
dynamic adaptation of programmes to changing environmental conditions. Monitoring and 
evaluation are essential instruments for improving government effectiveness. The technical 
case for evaluations is strong but account must be taken of associated costs and 
methodological challenges. There are costs attached to over-randomization (Barrett and 
Carter 2010), and it is feasible to consider conditions in which experimental evaluation of 
antipoverty transfers programmes might not be appropriate.2 
 
In the context of antipoverty transfer programmes, monitoring and evaluation processes also 
have a political role. Rigorous programme evaluation findings could help overcome 
opposition to antipoverty transfer programmes. In countries where elites are resistant to their 
introduction and scaling up, as has been the case in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                 
1    Pritchett discusses how the internal politics in multilaterals might help explain the scarcity of rigorous 
programme evaluation in international development (Pritchett 2002). 
2  Chile’s Chile Solidario was reformed in 2012 by a new right-of-centre administration in part because of 
mixed evaluation findings. This innovative multidimensional integrated antipoverty programme was evaluated 
as if it was a conditional cash transfer programme, which it was not.     2   
(SSA), impact evaluation findings can have powerful demonstration effects. Opposition to 
antipoverty transfer programmes can come from many quarters, including from agencies 
involved with competing development programmes; from interests groups seeking to protect 
their position and influence within government; from politicians keen to use public policy as 
a means to strengthen electoral support through sub-national governments seeking to prevent 
the centralization of power. Well-designed impact evaluations can provide crucial 
ammunition to those advocating antipoverty transfer programmes, help to undermine the case 
of those opposing them, and facilitate their adoption. If antipoverty transfer programmes are 
already in place, programme agencies may seek to use impact evaluations as a means of 
protecting themselves from day to day interference from politicians and bureaucrats; and in 
the medium term they can be used as a means to strengthen their sustainability by firming up 
public perceptions on the effectiveness of programmes. 
 
The approach we adopt is to map out the contrasting experiences of Latin America and SSA. 
Appendix 1 provides summary information on impact evaluations of antipoverty transfer 
programmes in Latin America and SSA. In Latin America, the rapid spread of human 
development conditional transfer programmes––also known in international policy debates as 
conditional cash transfer programmes––has been facilitated by the rigorous impact evaluation 
protocols implemented in Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades. and the findings thus generated 
(Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Rawlings and Rubio 2005). In SSA, on the other hand, the spread 
of antipoverty transfer programmes has been slowed down, arguably, by the limitations of 
monitoring and evaluation processes (Garcia and Moore 2012). The limited use of impact 
evaluations in SSA is due to well-known capacity and resource constraints, but also to the 
reluctance of local elites to embrace this agenda (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012). Pilot cash 
transfer programmes have been pushed by foreign donors in this region with an eye on their 
demonstration effects, but this orientation and purpose have meant that monitoring and 
evaluation processes did not figure prominently in their design and implementation. In Latin 
America, the main political role of evaluation processes has been to protect programmes from 
partisan politics and the threat of clientelism (Levy 2006). Examining the contrasting 
experiences of SSA and Latin America will help to extract general lessons for developing 
countries.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides a brief discussion of experimental 
and quasi-experimental evaluation methods and their import for antipoverty transfer 
programmes. Section 3 provides a framework for assessing the political feedback effects of 
evaluation processes also in the context of antipoverty transfer programmes. Section 4 
examines the experience of Latin American countries, while section 5 focuses on SSA. The 
final section draws out the main conclusions. 
2  Experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation of antipoverty programmes 
This section provides a brief review of approaches to the evaluation of antipoverty transfers.3 
Impact evaluation studies are employed to assess the effectiveness of these interventions and 
can also be used as a technical tool to inform decisions on further adjustments or scaling up. 
The main challenge is to attribute with confidence the changes in poverty to participation in 
the programmes (Ravallion 2005). To do this successfully we need a counterfactual, that is 
                                                 
3  For a more detailed discussion see the other studies prepared under the ReCom research initiative. 3   
we need to know what would have happened to poverty in the absence of the programme 
(Gertler et al. 2010). However, it is not possible to observe and compare poverty outcomes 
for a particular individual or household with and without participation in the programme. 
Instead, it is feasible to compare the outcomes of the programme for a treated or participating 
group and the same outcomes for a non-participating or control group. The methods used to 
select individuals into the programme can be a powerful confounder, as they rely on 
systematic differences in the initial characteristics of the two groups. In an experimental 
context, random assignment guarantees that differences in outcomes are not affected by 
assignment to the programme. In an experimental setting, the outcomes of the intervention 
are independent from the assignment rules (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2006). 
Experimental evaluations enable difference in difference estimators which compare changes 
in outcomes across treatment and controls groups from a baseline (Angrist and Pischke 
2008). 
 
In the context of antipoverty transfers, randomization is problematic and could strengthen 
opposition to the programme by political and social actors (Coady 2004). There are valid 
ethical concerns attached to preventing groups in poverty from benefiting from the 
programme. Alternatives to the experimental setting are desirable. Evaluations can be done 
by using observational or quasi-experimental data.  
 
The most popular approaches rely on matching techniques, instrumental variables, and 
regression discontinuity designs (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).4 Propensity score matching 
methods select a counterfactual group based on observable characteristics defining their 
probability of participation in the programme at the baseline. Differences in outcomes 
between participants and matched non-participants are attributed to the intervention 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Instrumental variable design is used to mitigate the selection 
bias of a non-random assignment by using a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, 
participation in the programme is predicted by another variable, the instrument, which is 
correlated with participation but uncorrelated with the potential outcome. At a second stage, 
participation probabilities are used to estimate treatment effects from the programme. 
Regression discontinuity relies on the identification of a fixed cut-off point on a continuous 
variable supporting assignment to a programme (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Typically non-
contributory pensions, where there is a specified age of entitlement, enable observation of 
this cut-off point. Differences in the outcome variable around the cut-off can be attributed to 
the programme.  
3  The political economy of programme evaluation  
The incidence of programme evaluation can also be explained by politics and political 
economy factors. The relative effectiveness of interventions and the perceptions of 
effectiveness among the general public and political elites could have implications for their 
adoption and sustainability. Measures of effectiveness provided by programme evaluations 
can therefore influence public opinion and political support for the programmes (Graham 
2002; Lindert and Vinscensini 2008). Several actors are important in this context: programme 
agencies and their preferences towards evaluation, multilateral donors engaged in poverty 
reduction in developing countries, bilateral donors and the voters and taxpayers they 
                                                 
4 Ravallion (2005) provides a summary of evaluation methods. 4   
represent, domestic political parties, and constituencies and their preferences towards 
redistribution and poverty reduction. In this section we sketch out some propositions on the 
positioning of these actors in relation to programme evaluation. These propositions will help 
organize the assessment of explanations for the incidence of antipoverty transfer programme 
evaluations in SSA and Latin America in the following sections.  
 
We hypothesize that programme agencies will have stronger incentives to include rigorous 
programme evaluation, that is, evaluation using experimental or quasi-experimental impact 
evaluation, the greater the resistance to antipoverty transfer programmes among the different 
actors involved (Levy 2006; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012). Resistance might come from at least 
two sources. First, it might come from competing programmes agencies vying for limited 
budgets. In this case, programme evaluation will be more likely the greater the 
competitiveness of the policy environment. Measures of the number of programmes and 
agencies involved could serve as a means of identifying policy competition. Second, 
resistance to antipoverty transfer programmes might come from strategic imperfections of 
political processes. To the extent that the introduction of antipoverty transfer programmes 
could lead to, or require, rules-based resource allocation and/or greater openness and 
accountability, these programmes will attract opposition from elites benefiting from 
discretionary and/or closed decision processes. In this case, programme agencies will have a 
stronger preference for rigorous programme evaluation the more closed and discretionary the 
decision-making processes are.  
 
Preferences for programme evaluation among multilateral donor agencies could be driven by 
two main factors: the degree of policy competition within the respective agencies and the 
incentives for policy innovation embedded in their management structures (Pritchett 2002). 
Policy competition within donor agencies makes rigorous programme evaluation an 
important tool to secure resources and influence. We can hypothesize that rigorous 
programme evaluation will be more likely in conditions of stronger policy competition and 
weaker incentives for innovation within multilateral agencies. The point about policy 
competition extends to contexts in which several multilaterals operate side by side. 
Multilaterals often have differences in objectives, capacities, and influence. In the context of 
antipoverty transfers, these differences play in support for specific target groups and policy 
instruments; for example, the extent to which antipoverty transfers should focus on children, 
or whether conditions are appropriate. In aid dependent countries in SSA, donor influence 
and donor competition have been important in facilitating or constraining programme 
evaluation (Devereux and White 2010; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012). These two determinants of 
preferences for programme evaluation also apply to bilaterals. Internal policy competition 
and incentives for innovation could be powerful drivers of programme evaluation. One 
additional point is important in the context of bilateral donors: the influence of political 
accountability to politicians and taxpayers in the donor country will, other things being equal, 
encourage evidence-based policy and by extension programme evaluation. Public attitudes to 
international aid in donor countries strongly influence the quantity and orientation of foreign 
aid (Chong and Gradstein 2006; World Bank 1998).  
 
In recipient countries, public perceptions regarding the effectiveness of antipoverty transfer 
programmes are important in aligning public and political support for programmes, especially 
from voters and taxpayers. To an extent, public perceptions are shaped by outcome and 
process indicators (Lindert and Vinscensini 2008). Rigorous programme evaluations provide 
important inputs into the process of shaping public perceptions and especially the perceptions 
of elites. This leads to the hypothesis that programme evaluations will be more likely the 5   
greater the predicted opposition to antipoverty transfer programmes. This is particularly 
important in the context of financial crises which place additional pressures on government 
spending. 
 
This brief discussion provides some pointers on the politics and political economy of 
programme evaluation. The discussion also indicates that programme evaluation is likely to 
have feedback effects upon the political and policy environment, in addition to implications 
for government effectiveness.  
4  Evaluation of antipoverty transfers in Latin America 
An important contribution of the recent expansion of antipoverty transfers in Latin America 
to the global drive to reduce poverty is the application of experimental methods of 
programme evaluation. This section discusses explanations for the use of programme 
evaluation in the region. 
  
The evaluation of Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades has acquired a paradigmatic status in 
the evaluation of antipoverty transfer programmes. In advance of the introduction of 
Progresa/Oportunidades in 1997, the Mexican government commissioned the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) to design and implement the evaluation of the 
programme (Skoufias 2005). The selection of Progresa/Oportunidades participants was done 
in three stages. First an index of marginalization identified the communities with the highest 
levels of deprivation in seven states. Progresa was initially implemented only in rural areas 
of these seven states, and was restricted to communities with less than 2,500 inhabitants. 
Second, a census in rural areas provided information on the socioeconomic status of 
households in these communities enabling a ranking of households. Third, community 
validation provided a check on the households selected for participation and led to the 
inclusion of additional households. Administrative constraints meant that the programme was 
rolled out in 1998 in a majority of the selected communities, but some were left for a later 
date. These constraints created conditions approximating an experimental setting. They 
enabled the identification of a treatment group of communities incorporated into the 
programme in 1998 and a control group incorporated by the end of 2000.5 Difference in 
differences estimates of impact provided strong evidence of the positive effects of 
Progresa/Oportunidades on participant households. This impact evaluation set a standard for 
other antipoverty programmes in the region, and elsewhere. 
 
The Progresa model can be contrasted with the other large-scale flagship programme in Latin 
America, such as Brazil’s Bolsa Escola.  Bolsa Escola emerged from municipal policy 
innovation in 1995 in three municipalities. The key insight supporting innovation was the 
view that for antipoverty transfers to have an impact on poverty, it was necessary to combine 
transfers in cash with conditions in children’s schooling. In 2007, the federal government 
offered counterpart funding in an effort to extend the programme to poorer municipalities 
facing resource limitations. In 2001, Bolsa Escola became a federal programme and in 2003 
it was consolidated into Bolsa Familia integrating four other cash transfer programmes 
including the Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour (PETI) initiated in 1996. 
                                                 
5  Comparisons of the treatment and control groups of communities confirmed the absence of significant bias or 
contamination (Behrman and Todd 1999). 6   
Research into Bolsa Escola at the sub-national level found positive impacts. Research into 
PETI supported by multilaterals also found strong positive effects (Yap, Sedlacek and 
Orazem 2002). The Brazilian Audit Court (2003) examined PETI and provided a strongly 
supportive evaluation of the programme. The evolution of Bolsa Escola and its consolidation 
into Bolsa Familia was not dependent on the results of impact evaluation studies.6 Support 
for the effectiveness of the programme came from independent research. Political opposition 
to Bolsa Escola and PETI was very limited, and there was broad support among Brazilian 
politicians for the use of direct transfers as a means of addressing poverty. There was wide 
and strong support for Bolsa Familia within the governing coalition and public perceptions of 
the programme associated it with President Lula.  
 
Evaluation protocols in later antipoverty transfers in Latin America provide yet another 
contrast with Progresa/Oportunidades. A good example is Juventud y Empleo (Youth and 
Employment) in the Dominican Republic. The programme is aimed at increasing the 
productivity of youths in poverty by providing job training and a cash stipend during the 
course and internship. Its evaluation protocols involve experimental methods through   
the random selection of participants. For each group of 35 applicants, 20 are randomly 
assigned to the treatment group and the rest to the control group. Assessment with baseline 
data confirmed that the two resulting groups showed no statistically significant differences in 
the individual characteristics of respondents. The experimental setting ensured that difference 
in outcomes across the two groups could be attributed to the programme (Card et al. 2011).  
 
Despite the prominence of experimental methods, impact evaluations relying on 
observational data are also common in the region. Borraz and González (2009) employ 
propensity score matching methods to evaluate Uruguay’s Ingreso Cuidadano (Citizenship 
Income). This antipoverty transfer programme was introduced in 2005 and was influenced by 
Brazil’s  Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s Oportunidades. It did not include an evaluation 
component as part of the implementation of the intervention, so the authors used secondary 
information from available household survey data and detected positive effects on human 
capital formation. Based on this observed data, the propensity score matching method 
allowed them to compare the treatment or participant group to a comparison or non-
participant group. Participants and non-participants were matched according to their 
probability of participation in the programme. The Ingreso Ciudadano was phased out in 
2007 and replaced by other interventions.  
 
Soares and Britto (2007) use administrative data to evaluate Paraguay’s Tekoporá,  an 
integrated anti-poverty social transfer. They compiled baseline information on beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries and later administered a follow-up survey to support quasi- 
experimental difference in difference estimates of impact. Similarly, Levy and Ohls (2010) 
evaluate the PATH social transfer in Jamaica using a regression discontinuity design. The 
evaluation relied on the discontinuity in eligibility scores and information from follow-up 
surveys. Finally, Attanasio et al. (2010) evaluate the impact of public nursery programme in 
Colombia operating since the 1980s, by relying on instrumental variable estimation to assess 
nutritional effects on participant children.  
 
These examples suggest competing explanations for the use of impact evaluations in Latin 
America. The paradigmatic case of Mexico’s Progresa shows the use of impact evaluations 
                                                 
6  An evaluation of Bolsa Familia by a consortium including IFPRI collected the first round of data only in 
2005. 7   
to address opposition to innovation from competing agencies, and in a context of budgetary 
restriction. There is strong evidence of the demonstration effects of impact evaluations. The 
evaluation findings from Mexico’s Progresa were a significant influence in the decision to 
extend the programme nationwide and to urban areas by the incoming Fox administration in 
Mexico in 2000. The finding from the evaluation of Progresa also influenced efforts in other 
countries. The document approving a loan for US$211 million in 2000 for Colombia’s 
Familias en Acción by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank noted that 
‘Programmes with conditional subsidy grant mechanisms similar to the one proposed here 
have been carried out in other countries of the region (Mexico, Honduras and Brazil), and 
have been evaluated as among the most successful social programmes’ (IADB 2000: 38). 
There is also direct evidence of the influence of multilaterals in the adoption of impact 
evaluations. An impact assessment of Colombia’s Familias en Accion was included as one of 
the conditions for the loan, replicating Progresa’s approach. According to Attanasio et al. 
(2005), the initial restriction of the operation of the programme to no more than 200 out of 
the 1100 municipalities in Colombia allowed the selection of ‘control’ municipalities in a 
quasi-experimental impact evaluation. The influence of multilaterals has been important in 
using the results from evaluations in successful programme to justify their adoption 
elsewhere. Guatemala’s Mi Familia Progresa, the Dominican Republic’s Solidaridad are also 
examples of evidence based policy diffusion.  
 
The presence of a successful impact evaluation and the influence of multilaterals could prove 
insufficient to guarantee the sustainability of a programme. In Nicaragua, an incoming 
government decided to phase out Red de Protección Social in spite of the positive outcomes 
of its impact evaluation and the support of multilaterals (Maluccio and Flores 2005).  
 
Issues with the appropriateness of evaluations have been raised by the evaluation of Chile’s 
Chile Solidario and the subsequent decision by the government to replace it. Chile Solidario 
was a multidimensional antipoverty poverty programme aimed at overcoming social 
exclusion among households in extreme poverty. The programme was designed to provide 
participant households with a personal social worker who ensured access to all existing 
public programmes addressing poverty, including transfers. The evaluation studies of Chile 
Solidario followed impact evaluations methods with observational data and identified 
comparison groups through, inter alia, propensity score matching techniques (Galasso 2006, 
2011; Guardia, Hojman and Larrañaga 2011). The effects identified pointed to marginal 
improvements. The difficulty is that, given the design of the programme, participant 
households differed from the equivalent non-participating households only in having had 
access to intermediation but not in programme entitlements. Non-participants were also 
entitled to the range of cash and in kind transfers. Despite this, key features of Chile Solidario 
have been reproduced in other programmes, including Paraguay’s Tekoporá and Colombia’s 
Red Unidos. 
 
Political and political economy factors have contributed in significant ways to the inclusion 
of impact evaluations of antipoverty transfers in Latin America. The attention to rigorous 
evaluations processes in Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades was motivated by the context in 
which the programme was designed and implemented (Levy 2006). The ongoing financial 
crisis meant that Progresa/Oportunidades needed to be financed through switching 
expenditure from other programmes. Alongside this, there was opposition from policy and 
government constituencies associated with existing antipoverty programmes. Political 
interference with antipoverty programmes and clientelism have seriously undermined their 
effectiveness. Proponents of Progresa/Oportunidades hoped to rely on evaluation processes 8   
to protect the programme from opposition within the government and also to protect it from 
interference. To an important extent, rigorous evaluation of antipoverty transfer programmes 
in Latin America is positively associated with the strength of opposition to the programme. 
Argentina’s Asignación Familiar Unica por Hijo is another example of a transfer programme 
with strong evaluation processes and also facing strong opposition from competing 
programme and policy and political constituencies.  
 
Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, on the other hand, did not face strong opposition within government 
and the organic extension of the programme across municipalities ensured a degree of 
political support, and the absence of opposition. In fact the introduction of other antipoverty 
transfer programmes in the early 2000s was in recognition both of their effectiveness and the 
degree of political support they enjoyed. The absence of strong opposition could have 
contributed to a relative neglect in setting up rigorous evaluations of the different transfer 
programmes later to be consolidated into Bolsa Familia.  
 
In Latin America, categorical antipoverty transfer programmes, non-contributory pensions 
and disability transfers to people in poverty in particular, have not been adequately evaluated. 
Several factors can explain this. These programmes are rarely supported by donor funds, they 
are sanctioned by legislation before their implementation, and there are fewer implications 
for work incentives thereby attracting less critical attention from voters and taxpayers. To the 
extent that individuals are eligible through personal characteristics like age, there is less 
discretion on the part of programme agencies. In fact, where categorical programmes are part 
of broader social assistance schemes, as was the case in Chile’s PASIS, they are more likely 
to be monitored for effectiveness.7 Another relevant factor is that categorical transfer 
programmes were designed to compensate groups for their limited work capacity and lacked 
specific objectives. Often, their grounding in social or citizenship rights precluded the need to 
evaluate their outcomes.  
 
In sum, an examination of evaluation practices in Latin America supports several of the 
hypotheses introduced earlier. Stronger evaluation reflects, inter alia, opposition from policy 
and political constituencies, competition for resources with established programmes, the 
presence of donor agencies, and the extent of discretion in implementation.   
5  Pilots and evaluation practice in sub-Saharan Africa 
In contrast to conditions in Latin America, antipoverty transfer programmes in SSA have 
progressed at a much slower pace. Historically South Africa and Namibia have relied on 
transfers in cash as a means of addressing poverty and vulnerability (Lund 2008; van der 
Berg 1997). Over time, social assistance grants have expanded in their reach and by 2010 one 
in every two households in South Africa had at least one member in receipt of a transfer. 
More recently, Lesotho has introduced antipoverty transfer programmes for older people and 
children along similar lines as in South Africa and Namibia, and Swaziland has introduced a 
social pension programme. Southern African countries are unique in SSA in having 
established large-scale antipoverty transfer programmes.  
 
                                                 
7  Chile’s PASIS was a social assistance transfer to older people in extreme poverty. It had a fixed budget to 
ensure it did not expand.  9   
The situation is substantively different in other sub-regions. There, antipoverty transfer 
programmes remain limited in scale, scope and institutionalization (Garcia and Moore 2012; 
Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012). With few exceptions, they consist of pilot transfer programmes, 
heavily dependent on donors’ financial support and technical assistance. In East Africa, an 
exception is Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, providing guaranteed employment 
in food insecurity areas and direct transfers to households without members of working age. 
It currently reaches around 11 per cent of the population. Kenya’s Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children  Programme reaches around 100,000 households. Mozambique’s Food Subsidy 
Programme has been in existence in different forms since 1991. It currently reaches around 
125,000 households with older people and people with disabilities in acute poverty. Zambia, 
Malawi, Tanzania, and more recently Uganda and Rwanda have introduced pilot social 
transfer programmes. In west and central Africa, several countries are introducing social 
transfer programmes on a very small scale. Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment against 
Poverty Programme reaches less than 30,000 households, and Nigeria’s In Care of the Poor 
Programme was intended to reach 1,000 households in 12 districts, in a country of 160 
million and with high poverty incidence. The route to establishing large-scale antipoverty 
transfers in SSA is considerably more difficult than in Latin America.  
  
There are several explanations for the relatively slow progress of antipoverty transfer 
programmes in Africa when compared to Latin America.8 The incidence of poverty is 
significantly greater than in Latin America, and resources to address it are more limited. Of 
particular interest in the context of this paper are constraints deriving from the political and 
policy environment.  
 
Donors have played an important role in the expansion of antipoverty transfers in SSA. Their 
involvement in encouraging the adoption of social transfers, providing financial support, 
supplementing delivery capacity within public agencies, and influencing programme design 
and implementation, has been studied in some detail (Beales and German 2006; Devereux 
and White 2010; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012). Donors have supported policy diffusion from 
antipoverty transfer programmes in Latin America, particularly human development 
conditional transfer programmes. Leaving South Africa and Namibia aside, the difference is 
that in SSA they have led, whereas in Latin America they have followed.9  
 
In SSA, multilaterals and bilaterals have a strong motivation for pushing antipoverty 
transfers. By the 1990s, repeated and regular food crises in eastern Africa had transformed 
emergency food aid into a regular feature. The case for replacing annual rounds of emergency 
assistance with regular forms of support for food insecure households was obvious to donors 
and researchers (Barrett and Maxwell 2005). Social transfers provided an attractive, and 
likely more effective, option (DFID 2005). In highly indebted and aid dependent countries, 
poverty reduction strategy processes provided a forum in which social transfers could be 
inserted within national policy discussions and pushed by donors.  
 
Variation in the quality of donor harmonization across these countries has influenced the 
process of adoption of new policies, which in part explains variations in antipoverty transfer 
                                                 
8  Arguably, the pace of progress in Africa could look different if the origins of the largest human development 
transfer programmes in Latin America are acknowledged. Bolsa Escola began in a handful of municipalities in 
Brazil in 1995 and became a national programme only in 2001.  
9  In Paraguay and Central American countries, international donors have had a stronger role (Barrientos and 
Santibañez 2009).  10   
programme design and scale. In the context of SSA, the hypothesis that donor competition 
would make evaluation more likely does not apply without further modification. In fact, in 
countries with strong competition across multilaterals and bilaterals, the evaluation of 
antipoverty transfer programmes has been limited. To understand this apparent disjunction, it 
is important to pay attention to the interaction of government and donors. Competition among 
donors in a context of government resistance to antipoverty transfer programmes has 
contributed to a rush to implementation. Resistance and delays in getting government 
approval for the implementation of pilot programmes have often forced donors to seek to 
implement pilot programmes before collecting baseline data or setting in place rigorous 
evaluation protocols. As a consequence most first-generation pilot transfer programmes in 
SSA lacked rigorous evaluation procedures.10 The fact that pilot programmes lack the very 
tools needed to generate knowledge on their feasibility and effectiveness is regrettable.11 
Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, a focus on pilot programmes as 
‘demonstration’ tools effectively lifts pressure on programme agencies to include rigorous 
evaluation protocols in the design and implementation of antipoverty transfer programmes.   
 
Several factors explain the resistance from domestic elites to direct transfers in cash as a 
means to reduce poverty. The pervasiveness of food aid as the principal source of support for 
food insecure households encouraged clientelistic forms of politics and strong interest groups 
(Munemo 2007). These groups were naturally opposed to direct transfers in cash. Resistance 
to social transfers has been strong among finance ministers in the region, for arguably 
sensible reasons. Donors generally commit financial support for the start-up of social transfer 
programmes but are reluctant to commit to the medium- and longer-term needs of these 
programmes, given current aid modalities. This imposes a large measure of uncertainty over 
the longer-term financial sustainability of antipoverty transfers. Domestic political elites are 
also concerned with electoral ratchet effects on the scale of programmes. Even if the transfers 
were to be limited to a fraction of households in extreme poverty, electoral cycles are likely 
to generate pressures to extend the support to other groups.12 In low-income countries where 
a significant proportion of the population, if not a majority, are in poverty or perceive 
themselves to be in poverty, voters are bound to exercise electoral pressure on their 
representatives to extend transfers to them with obvious implications for the longer-term 
financial sustainability of the programmes. There is also a widely-shared view among elites 
in SSA that transfers will generate dependency, and cash transfers may encourage 
corruption.13 Sub-national disparities and patrimonial politics also militate against accepting 
rule-based transfer programmes. In addition, elite perceptions of the strength of informal 
assistance share a greatly exaggerated assessment the strength of these networks. These 
factors are important in explaining resistance to direct transfer in cash as a means of 
addressing poverty, but the list is not exhaustive.   
 
                                                 
10  Adequacy can be measured in terms of the presence or absence of a baseline, the quality of the data 
collected, and the expertise and experience of the teams performing the evaluations. 
11  Second-generation pilot programmes are paying more attention to impact evaluation. See the Protection to 
Production initiative website at SSAwww.fao.org/economic/PtoP/en/. 
12  Preferences for social pensions among SSA governments can be explained in part because the associated 
financial liabilities can be calculated with some precision, and also because civil servants themselves are 
uncertain of their pension entitlements.  
13    Interestingly, this view might be a reflection of aid  dependency but also a sense that, given donors’ 
commitments to poverty reduction, domestic resources might well be applied elsewhere.  11   
The standoff between the donors’ push for the adoption of direct transfer in cash as an 
alternative to food aid on the one hand, and the domestic elites’ resistance to them on the 
other has been resolved in several countries through the implementation of pilot projects. 
Pilot projects enable donors and domestic agencies to experiment with new forms of 
delivering aid, while limiting their implementation to localized areas. Pilot projects should in 
principle help provide information on whether transfer programmes have been designed and 
implemented correctly, and also provide necessary learning and training for the relevant 
agencies. Pilots facilitate an effective scaling up of programmes, and are an important 
component of evaluation processes.  
 
In practice, pilots have seldom incorporated strong evaluation procedures in SSA (Davis et al. 
2012). This can be explained by the fact that donors have been more focused on using pilot 
programmes as a tool to engage and persuade domestic political elites, and their own 
colleagues in multilaterals and bilateral organizations, of the advantages of transfer 
programmes, than as a means to assess their effectiveness in possibly adverse conditions. The 
crucial point is that pilot programmes were not designed with the expectation that they would 
be scaled up, as was the case in most Latin American countries. Pilots have been used largely 
as ‘demonstration’ devices, as a means to gain commitment for them from reluctant elites. 
Pilots, in the main, have had a political function.14 These demonstration effects were also 
intended to work within the relevant multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, many of which 
lacked a strong evaluation ethos (Pritchett 2002). Many programmes in SSA have been 
implemented by commissioned non-government agencies with an interest in ensuring control 
over the perceived outcomes of the programmes.  
 
Garcia and Moore find that only a minority of transfer programmes in SSA have any 
evaluation components (Garcia and Moore 2012). Of those that do, they find in a sample of 
SSA transfer programmes, that experimental evaluation is much more common among 
conditional transfer programmes than among unconditional programmes. This is partly 
because the design and potential outcomes of conditional transfer programmes are contested.   
 
In some countries the designers of antipoverty transfer programmes paid closer attention to 
evaluation, but it is hard to generalize from their experience. Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net 
Programme included stronger evaluation components, including the participation of IFPRI in 
the design and analysis of it (Gilligan, Hoddinott and Seyoum Taffesse 2008; Gilligan et al. 
2007). This is in part explained by the resistance of domestic elites to competing policy 
advice from multilaterals and bilaterals. Donor harmonization paved the way for government 
commitment to the implementation of the programme, and is to an important extent 
responsible for the attention paid to evaluation in this case. Kenya’s Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children  Programme also includes a strong evaluation component, implemented by an 
external consultancy firm Oxford Policy Management. In this case, donor competition, 
especially as regards the design of the programme, is likely the factor responsible for the 
attention to evaluation. Disagreements between donors and the government in the case of 
Ethiopia and disagreements among donors in Kenya appear to have encouraged attention to 
evaluation protocols.15 The political processes involved have affected the implementation of 
evaluation protocols. In both cases, the absence of baseline data has generated uncertainty 
                                                 
14  Garcia and Moore (2012) argue that pilot programmes can in theory address both political and technical 
issues. 
15  The World Bank participated in both. 12   
over the findings from the evaluations. At any rate, it is unclear whether these evaluations 
have had any significant feedback effects.16 In Ethiopia, the evaluation findings were mixed 
and the government is engaged in a review of the programme. In Kenya, the government 
pushed ahead with the scaling up of the programme before the evaluation was fully 
completed. 
 
More recent programmes have paid more attention to evaluation, although this is some way 
away from the kind of experimental evaluation implemented in Mexico’s 
Progresa/Oportunidades. The findings from these evaluations are beginning to emerge in the 
public domain.17 
 
As it was the case with the discussion on Latin America in the previous section, competing 
explanations for the incidence and quality of antipoverty programme evaluation exist in SSA. 
Overall, the evaluation of antipoverty transfers in SSA has been weaker and less successful. 
This is intriguing because the political and policy environment is such that evaluation could 
have played an important role. The influence of donors and competition among donors have 
not led to rigorous evaluation of antipoverty transfers in the region. Reluctance by domestic 
political elites to embrace antipoverty transfer programmes again would have signalled a 
strong role of impact evaluations. The nature of the interactions between donors and domestic 
political elites could help explain why rigorous evaluations of antipoverty transfer 
programmes are hard to find in SSA. This interaction generated pressures for donors to rush 
to implementation, with insufficient attention paid to evaluation protocols. Donors have 
focused on pilots mainly for their demonstration effects, and paid limited attention to their 
capacity to generate knowledge on effectiveness. Weaknesses in the implementation of 
impact evaluations have limited their role in supporting their sustainability and resilience to 
political processes. The fact that pilots were highly localized and were not embedded in 
government structures and domestic politics effectively lifted the incentives for rigorous 
evaluation which would have been predicted under conditions of agency competition and 
political opposition.    
6 Conclusions   
The paper has undertaken a comparative analysis of evaluation practices in antipoverty 
transfer programmes in Latin America and SSA. A strong focus on rigorous evaluation has 
been a feature of the recent growth of antipoverty transfer programmes in developing 
countries. Experimental (and to some degree quasi-experimental) methods are widely 
perceived as a ‘gold standard’ in the evaluation of antipoverty transfer programmes in 
developing countries. The evaluation protocols followed by the designers of Mexico’s 
Progresa have been hugely influential in the rest of Latin America, and elsewhere. 
 
What explains the incidence of rigorous programme evaluation in the context of antipoverty 
transfers? The paper identified and discussed two broad explanations: one emphasizes 
technical factors in the context of a shift to evidence-based international development policy; 
the second emphasizes political factors, and especially a perceived need to address opposition 
to the introduction or scaling up of antipoverty transfer programmes. The paper discussed the 
                                                 
16  In both cases the first round of data collection took place after the programme had been implemented, 
17  See footnote 11. 13   
relevance of these two broad explanations for the incidence of evaluation in the context of 
Latin America and SSA. The analysis suggests that both technical and political factors are 
relevant. It also suggested the interaction of these two factors can help explain regional 
differences in the scope and quality of evaluations. In Latin America technical capacities and 
opposition to antipoverty transfers explain the incidence of programme evaluation, for 
example the contrasting attention to programme evaluation in antipoverty transfer 
programmes in Mexico and Brazil. In SSA, opposition to antipoverty transfers and 
competition among domestic and international agencies would have signalled greater 
attention to evaluation in programmes design and implementation, but a focus on pilots 
undermined pressures for rigorous programme evaluation.  
  
Monitoring and evaluation protocols are crucial to facilitate improvements in government 
effectiveness. An important insight contributed by this paper is that, at least in the context of 
antipoverty policy, political factors have a strong influence on the incidence and quality of 
evaluation processes and on the extent to which their findings influence policy stakeholders. 
Experimental and quasi-experimental programme evaluation of antipoverty transfer 
programmes has influenced government agencies’ effectiveness, but this influence is strongly 
intermediated by political conditions.  
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Appendix 1: Selected social transfer programmes and their impact on beneficiaries and political economy matters 
Type  Country - Region Programme name  Description  Law 
enacted? 
Impact evaluation / replicated 
 from 
Political economy decision 
   
Cash transfers       
  Brazil - LAC  Bolsa Familia  Pure CCT programme aimed at 
closing the poverty gap. Targeting is 
based on single mean testing. 
Yes  Ex-ante simulation. Inspired by a 
federal intervention in the city of 
Campinas in 1995 (Bourguignon et 
al. 2003). 
Scale-up the programme to 11 million 
beneficiaries. 
    
    
 Colombia  -  LAC  Familias en Accion  CCT programme with complementary 
services for adults and children. 
Targeting based on proxy mean 
testing. The programme started in 
2001. 
Yes  Quasi-experiment based on 
Propensity Score Matching at 
municipality level. Improvements in 
child human capital and women 
empowerment (Attanasio et al. 
2005). Inspired by Mexico's 
Progresa/Oportunidades. 
Due to the positive impact originated by  
the CCT, the decision was to scale-up the 
programme to 3 million beneficiaries. 
    
    
 Ghana  -  Africa  Livelihood 
Empowerment Against 
Poverty - LEAP 
Cash transfer programme with 
geographic selection designed as 
CCT but no monitoring has been 
implemented so far. 
Yes  Replicated from the Latin 
American experience and 
technically assisted by the World 
Bank and UNICEF.  
The Ghanaian government created the 
growth and poverty reduction strategy in 
2005, where the LEAP was proposed.  
The initial plan was to reach 30,000 
households. In 2012 the programme 
initiated a scaling-up process to enrol 
200,000 households by 2015. 
    
    
  Kenya - Africa  Cash Transfers for 
Orphan and 
Vulnerable Children 
Cash transfer strategy that combines 
conditionalities in some pilot districts 
with pure income transfers. Entitled 
households must belong to the 
selected district with an individual 
proxy mean testing method, 
complemented with a community 
based validation. 
No  Pilot phase of the programme 
started with an ex-ante evaluation 
in 2004. In 2008 the World Bank 
sponsored the exchange of the 
Latin American experience and the 
programme and included a quasi-
experimental evaluation whose 
results were published by The 
Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team 
(2012). 
The programme initiated a pilot with 7 
districts and 17,500 households. A loan 
from the World Bank, a donation from 
UNICEF and the commitment from the 
Kenyan government started a scaling up 
plan to reach 74,000 households. Taking 
the reference from Latin America the 
intervention was required to include a 
conditionality component in some districts, 
where attendance in health and school 
services is mandatory.  
    
    
  Lesotho - Africa  Child Grants 
Programme 
Pure cash transfer aimed at 
supporting orphans and vulnerable 
children (OVC).  
No  European Commission donated 
the funds to run the programme for 
5 yrs through UNICEF in 2007. 
Programme included an evaluation 
component based on an 
experiment. The programme was 
inspired by the South Africa's Child 
Support Grant. 
The evaluation report was issued in 
January 2012 (Pellerano et al. 2012).  
Due to the negative impact of the rain 
season, the World Food Programme and 
UNPD provided additional funding to 
extend the programme for one more year.  
     …/.
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Type   Country - Region Programme name  Description  Law 
enacted? 
Impact evaluation / replicated from Political economy decision 
   
Cash transfers       
    
  Mexico - LAC  Progresa/Oportunida
des 
CCT programme with 
complementary services for adults 
and children initiated in 1997. 
Yes Experimental  method. 
Improvement of nutritional status 
in the early childhood and school 
attendance in rural areas 
(Skoufias 2005). 
Scale-up the programme up to 5 million 
beneficiaries. 
    
    
  Malawi - Africa  Social Cash Transfer  Unconditional cash transfers that 
aim to reduce poverty and 
guarantee food security. Due to the 
evaluation strategy the initial 
individual selection process 
included a random assignment. 
No 
 
The programme started in 2006 
with an experimental evaluation 
method. A report highlighted that 
the SCT increases the 
investment in agricultural assets 
and inputs. However, low skilled 
adult workers reduced their 
labour supply, while children 
increased farm-related activities 
at home (Covarrubias, Davis and 
Winters 2012). 
The programme was initially assisted  
by UNICEF in 2006. The programme's 
pilot initiated in one district and scaled-up 
into six. In 2012 Malawi received a 
contribution from the European Union  
for funding the programme. 
    
    
 Nicaragua  – 
LAC 
Red de Protección 
Social 
Pure CCT programme with proxy 
mean testing. 
No Experimental  method. 
Improvements in school 
attendance, vaccination and 
health of participating children 
(Maluccio and Flores 2005). 
The programme operated from 2000  
until 2007. The Nicaraguan government 
replaced it by an in-kind transfer of 
livestock (chickens, hens, pigs, seeds and 
technical assistance). 
    
    
  Nigeria - Africa  Kano State CCT for 
girls 
CCT with verified conditionalities 
targeted to school-aged girls in the 
Kano State in northern Nigeria. The 
programme is in its pilot stage, 
funded by the federal MDG fund. 
No  The programmes is replicated 
from the Latin American 
experience. The programme was 
randomly assigned with 
experimental evaluation. 
The evaluation of the pilot phase (with 
10,000 recipients) will provide essential 
information on the scope of the results as 
well as the operational requirements. The 
implementation entails the use of 
biometric identification and alternative 
payments, such as cell phones and SMS 
    
    
 Philippines  – 
Asia 
Pantawid Pamilyang 
Pilipino Program 
Pure CCT programme with proxy 
mean testing. Benefits cover 
children between 0-14 yrs old and 
pregnant women. 
Yes Inspired  by 
Progresa/Oportunidades, Bolsa 
Familia and Familias en Acción 
in 2008. 
The programme was expected to reach 
321,000 households in 2013. However, 
the pilot phase was speeded up and in 
2012, it had 2.8 million beneficiaries. 
            
           …/. 
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Type   Country - Region Programme name  Description  Law 
enacted? 
Impact evaluation / replicated from Political economy decision 
Cash transfers               
 South  Africa  - 
Africa 
South African Grant 
System 
Is a set of unconditioned cash 
transfers composed by the child 
support grant, old age pension, 
disability grant, care dependency 
grant and the foster care grant. The 
broad of the targeting criterion is 
based on the different categories in 
which the recipients are classified, 
while the assignment is mean 
tested. The first one to be 
introduced was the old age pension 
in 1928. 
Yes  The system emulates some 
European welfare approaches 
and was not designed on an 
evaluation policy. However, the 
targeting criteria have allowed 
the impact assessment 
employing quasi-experimental 
methods, such as regression 
discontinuity and dose-response 
functions, especially for the old 
age pension and the child 
support grant. in both cases 
positive effects have been 
detected on nutrition, school 
attendance and child labour 
(Heinrich et al.  2012) 
Given that the programmes obey to a 
rights-based assignment, the impact 
evaluations in the last decade have  
been informative but not decisive.  
Rather, they have been used as example 
for the implementation of similar 
interventions in other developing 
countries. 
    
    
 Tanzania  - 
Africa 
Community-Based 
Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programme 
Pilot CCT programme started in 
2008. It is testing a novel approach 
of targeting and monitoring based 
on the community work instead of 
the institutional capacity. The 
targeting method is based on the 
community agreement and proxy 
mean test. It is part of the Tanzania 
Social Action Fund (TSAF) that had 
a first phase between 2000-05. 
No  The programme replicates de 
Latin American experience with 
the support of the UNICEF and a 
loan from the World Bank. It has 
its own evaluation component 
based on a village-level random 
trial. 
The impact evaluation results are 
expected to be released in 2013.  
Given the fact that this CCT is  
testing a community component, this 
assessment will bring the main decision-
making element in order  
to scale it up upon a national level. 
    
    
  Turkey - Asia  Social Risk Mitigation 
Project 
Pure CCT Programme with proxy 
mean testing. 
No 
 
Inspired by 
Progresa/Oportunidades in 2001. 
The World Bank provided a US$500 
million loan for the pilot and first phase. 
The target was 1.1 million recipients. 
    
    
  Uruguay - LAC  Ingreso Ciudadano  CCT programme created, among 
others, as part of an emergency 
package between 2005-07. 
Yes  The programme was replicated 
from the general design of CCT 
in Latin America. No impact 
evaluation was included as part 
of the implementation but 
household surveys allowed the 
assessment of the programme 
with quasi-experimental methods 
(Borraz and González 2009).  
The programme was replaced by the 
'Equity Plan' that was introduced in  
2007. 
       …/. 
1
9
    
   
Appendix 1: Selected social transfer programmes and their impact on beneficiaries and political economy matters 
Type   Country - Region  Programme name  Description  Law 
enacted? 
Impact evaluation / replicated from   Political economy decision 
Integrated poverty alleviation strategies        
         
 Chile  -  LAC Chile Solidario  Cash transfer and integrated anti-
poverty strategy. Based on proxy 
mean testing. 
Yes Independent  quasi-experiments 
using secondary data have found 
no effects of this intervention on 
poverty reduction (Galasso 
2011). However, Guardia et al. 
(2011) detected positive effects 
on number of workers in the 
family and some other labour 
indicators.  
Initially, the Chilean government  
intended this intervention to reach 
250,000 households. The current 
government created the Ministry of Social 
Development and Chile Solidario strategy 
is now known as Ingreso Etico Familiar 
(Ethical Family Income).  
    
    
 Colombia  -  LAC  Red Unidos  Pure anti-poverty strategy. Extreme 
poor targeted by proxy mean 
testing. 
No Replicated  from  Chile Solidario in 
2006. Ongoing quasi-
experimental impact evaluation. 
Programme, initiated in 2006, is currently 
at an expansion phase. The institutional 
instability of the executing agency has 
held back its implementation. 
    
    
  Jamaica - LAC  Programme of 
Advancement 
Through Health and 
Education - PATH 
Social transfer that selects poor 
households with an assignment 
score (a proxy mean test) with five 
different categories of focus: 
children, elderly, people with 
disabilities, pregnant and lactating 
women and poor adults between 18-
59 yrs old. 
No  The programme is based on 
previous CCT interventions like 
Progresa/Oportunidades but 
extends its scope beyond human 
capital formation. It has a quasi-
evaluation design that showed 
positive short-term effects on 
human capital an poverty 
reduction (Levy and Ohls 2010) 
The programme had funding between 
2001-05 from the Jamaican government 
and a loan from the World Bank. In the 
light of the positive effects of the pilot 
phase, the PATH was scaled-up to 
180,000 beneficiaries.  
    
    
 Paraguay  -  LAC  Tekoporá  Cash transfer and integrated anti-
poverty strategy with proxy mean 
testing. 
No Inspired  by  Chile Solidario in 
2005. A propensity score 
matching method showed that 
the programme caused a 
significant increase In school 
attendance (Teixeira et al., 
2011). Soares et al. (2008) found 
positive effects of Tekoporá on 
consumption.  
After a pilot with 3,453 households in 
2005 the programme is intended to 
reach 200,000. 
         
  El Salvador - 
LAC 
Red Solidaria  Cash transfer and anti-poverty 
strategy. Targeting based on 
poverty mapping. 
Yes Inspired  by 
Progresa/Oportunidades in 2005. 
In 2007 the programme was introduced 
In urban areas. 
           …/. 
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Appendix 1: Selected social transfer programmes and their impact on beneficiaries and political economy matters 
Type   Country - Region Programme name  Description  Law 
enacted? 
Impact evaluation / replicated from    Political economy decision 
Active labour market programmes with transfers       
     
 Chile  -  LAC  Chile Joven  Job training programme for youths 
between 16-24 yrs old. The intervention 
operated from 1991 through 1999 in two 
phases. Was the first youth training 
programme Latin America that 
incorporated basic or life skills, technical 
training and cash stipend. Targeted by 
proxy mean testing. 
Yes  External quasi-experimental evaluation 
with propensity score matching. The 
programme improved the labour 
market insertion of 50% of participating 
youths (Jacinto and Gallart 1998).  
The programme was phased out in 
1999 after enrolling 170 youngsters. 
The Chilean government decided to 
integrate all job training programmes 
into one intervention so-called 
Programa Nacional de Becas - 
national scholarships programme. 
    
    
 Colombia  - 
LAC 
Jovenes en Acción  Job training programme aimed at 
improving the employability of youths 
between 18-25 yrs old by training and 
on-the-site practice. Targeted by a proxy 
mean test. 
No  Quasi-experimental evaluation base on 
difference-in-differences. Intervention 
increased the probability of being 
employed. Most results were not 
significant for female participants 
(DNP-SINERGIA 2008). This 
programme was inspired by Chile 
Joven in 2000. 
The programme was phased down  
in 2007 and its administration relies 
completely on the national training 
service.  
         
 Dominican 
Republic - 
LAC 
Juventud y Empleo  Job training programme with technical 
instruction and internships. The 
programme transfers cash to 
participating youths between 16-29 yrs 
old. Geographically targeted in poor 
areas with randomly individual 
assignment. 
No  Experimental evaluation with several 
cohorts. Increases formal jobs for 
males and wages for females (Card et 
al, 2011). Replicated from Chile Joven 
in 2008. 
The impact evaluation and monitor- 
ing data allowed the redesign of the 
programme and the expansion to most 
of large cities in the country  
with 40,000 beneficiaries. 
    
    
 Ethiopia  - 
Africa 
Productive Safety 
Nets Programme 
The programme was launched in 2005 
as one of the largest public works 
intervention in Africa, reaching more 
than 7 million beneficiaries 
geographically selected. 
No  It is based on the South Asian public 
work experience. The evaluation relies 
on a quasi-experiment performed by 
the IFPRI (Gilligan et al. 2008) who 
found positive effects on food security 
and livestock accumulation. 
After an initial phase 2005-07 reaching 
5 million workers, the programme 
evolved into a second one reaching 
7/6 beneficiaries with a total 
investment of 1.040 million dollars 
(80% form donors) in which the 
government committed with in-kind 
contribution. 
    
    
 Malawi  - 
Africa 
Public Works 
Programme 
Workfare programme without training 
component that aims to create 
temporary employment by building 
infrastructure in rural areas. It was 
introduced in 1995. 
No  It is based on the South Asia's 
workfare experience. The programme 
does not count on an exhaustive 
impact evaluation. Chirwa et al. (2002) 
performed a linear regression with 
selection bias correction; they found 
positive effects on employment levels. 
The operation of the PWP has 
fluctuated since it was initiated in  
the mid-1990s depending on the  
flow of donors' resources.  
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